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Abstract
We report on a quantitative analysis of relationships between the number of homicides,
population size and other ten urban metrics. By using data from Brazilian cities, we show
that well defined average scaling laws with the population size emerge when investigating
the relations between population and number of homicides as well as population and urban
metrics. We also show that the fluctuations around the scaling laws are log-normally
distributed, which enabled us to model these scaling laws by a stochastic-like equation
driven by a multiplicative and log-normally distributed noise. Because of the scaling
laws, we argue that it is better to employ logarithms in order to describe the number
of homicides in function of the urban metrics via regression analysis. In addition to the
regression analysis, we propose an approach to correlate crime and urban metrics via the
evaluation of the distance between the actual value of the number of homicides (as well
as the value of the urban metrics) and the value that is expected by the scaling law with
the population size. This approach have proved to be robust and useful for unveiling
relationships/behaviors that were not properly carried out by the regression analysis,
such as i) the non-explanatory potential of the elderly population when the number of
homicides is much above or much below the scaling law, ii) the fact that unemployment
has explanatory potential only when the number of homicides is considerably larger than
the expected by the power law, and iii) a gender difference in number of homicides,
where cities with female population below the scaling law are characterized by a number
of homicides above the power law.
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2Introduction
The study of social complex systems has been the focus of intense research in the last
decades [1–3]. Elections [4,5], population growth [6,7], economy [8–10], and language [11–
13] are just a few examples of social activities that have been recently investigated. Such
investigations are expected to provide a better understanding of how our society is orga-
nized and also to point out better strategies for resource management, service allocation,
and political strategies. In this social context, crime is one of the most worrying activity
for our society and to understand and to prevent crime acts is a huge challenge [14–16].
Moreover, since nowadays more than a half of the human population lives in cities [17,18],
it is crucial to analyze possible connections between criminality and urban metrics.
In fact, there exist several works that point out relationships between the number of
crime acts and urban indicators such as income, unemployment and inequality [19–23].
Most of these papers employ regression analysis, where the dependent variable is the crime
indicator (usually the number of a particular crime act) and the independent variables are
urban indicators [24–33]. However, most of these studies does not take into account the
functional form of the relationships between crime, urban indicators and the population;
usually assuming these relationships to be linear [34]. On the other hand, several works
have shown that crime and urban indicators obey scaling laws with the population size
of the cities and also between themselves [35–39]. For instance, the number of homicides
grows super-linearly with the population [39,40]. Do not consider these scaling laws may
be one of the reasons that several regression-based analysis led to controversial conclu-
sions [34]. Furthermore, if we assume that these scaling laws with the population size
are somehow a natural expression of how cities are organized, accounting for the scaling
phenomenon is also very important for achieving a fairer comparison between cities with
different population sizes.
Here we investigate a procedure that may help to solve this problem. The approach
consists of defining a “distance” between the crime or urban indicators and the main
tendency expected by the scaling laws with the population size. This approach is based
on the recent idea of relative competitiveness proposed by Podobnik et al. [41] in the
economic context. Our paper is thus organized as follows. We start by presenting our data
of urban and crime indicators of Brazilian cities and also an intensive characterization of
the scaling laws existing between these indicators and the population size. We also employ
3a linear regression model for explaining the number of crime acts (homicides) in terms
of the urban indicators. Next, we use the previously-discussed distance in an attempt to
investigate relationships/patterns between crime and urban metrics that do not appear
in the regression analysis. Finally, we present a summary of our results.
Materials and Methods
Data presentation
We have accessed data of the Brazilian cities in the year of 2000 made freely available by
the Brazil’s public healthcare system — DATASUS [1]. These data are also attached to our
paper in the Supplementary Table S1. Here, despite there being other definitions [43], we
have considered that cities are the smallest administrative units with a local government
and it is not our intention to discuss the role of other definitions. The data consist of
the population size (N) and the number of homicides (H) as well as ten urban indicators
(Y ) at city level: number of cases of child labour, elderly population size (older than 60
years), female population size, gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, number
of illiterate (older than 15 years), average family income, male population size, number of
sanitation facilities, and number of unemployed (older than 16 year). More details about
urban indicators can be found in the Supplementary Text S1. Observe that we have chosen
the number of homicides as our crime indicator. This is a widely used choice [39] due
the fact that homicide data are more reliable, since this ultimate expression of violence
is almost always reported. Also, our ten urban indicators are usually listed as crime
determinants [34]. Furthermore, we have considered only cities with at least one case of
homicide in our analysis.
Results and Discussion
Scaling laws between crime, urban metrics and population
We start by revising the question of whether homicides and urban metrics present scaling
relations with the population size (see also Refs. [35–40]). For the sake of simplicity, let
us denote the population size by N and the urban indicators by Y . We thus want to
4check if Y is a power law function of N , that is, Y ∼ Nβ, where β is the power law
exponent. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of log10 Y versus log10N for all urban indicators,
starting with the number of homicides and passing through all the ten urban metrics. We
note that, despite the existence of considerable noise in some relationships, the scaling
laws with the population size are perceptible. In order to overcome the noise and uncover
the main tendency in these relationships, we have binned the data in w windows equally
spaced in log10N and evaluated the average values of the points within each window. The
square symbols shown in Fig. 1 represent these average values and the dashed lines are
linear fits. Note that linear functions describe quite well all the average relations, that is,
the equation
〈log10 Y 〉w = A+ β log10N (1)
holds for all the urban indicators. Here, 〈log10 Y 〉w is the average value of Y within
each one of the w windows, A is a constant and β is the power law exponent (shown in
Fig. 1). We have thus confirmed that there are scaling laws between the average values of
the urban indicators Y and the population N . It is worth to remark that these average
relationships are very robust when varying the number of windows w (see Fig. S1).
Another striking feature of Fig. 1 is the fluctuation around the power law tendency.
We have observed that the standard deviation
σw =
√
〈(〈log10 Y 〉w − log10 Y )2〉w (2)
within each window practically does not change with the population size N for all urban
indicators (Fig. 2A). We have also verified that the normalized residuals around the power
law,
ξ =
log10 Y (N)− 〈log10 Y 〉w
σw
, (3)
are normally distributed with zero mean and unitary standard deviation (Fig. 2B). In
particular, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [45] cannot reject the normality of ξ for all the
urban indicators (the p-values are all larger than 0.51).
Our previous analysis thus enable an elegant formulation to the average scaling laws
and also to the noise around these tendencies. Mathematically, we can write
Y = A η(N)Nβ (4)
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Figure 1. Scaling laws between the population size and the urban indicators.
In each plot, the green dots are base-10 logarithmic of the values of the urban indicator
(Y ) versus the population size (N) for a given city. The black squares are average values
of the data binned in 10 equally spaced windows and the error bars are 95% confidence
intervals for these average values obtained via bootstrapping [44]. The values of the
Pearson correlation coefficients ρ (as well as the 95% confidence intervals) of these
relationships are shown in each plot. The straight dashed lines are linear fits (by least
square method) to the average relationships and the slope of these lines are equal to the
power law exponent β (shown in each plot).
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Figure 2. Fluctuations around the scaling laws. (A) Standard deviation σw of the
fluctuations around the scaling laws (in base-10 logarithmic scale) in each one of the
w = 10 equally spaced windows. We note that the standard deviation is almost a
constant function of the population for all urban indicators. The average value of σw
over the population windows are shown in the plot legends. (B) Cumulative distributions
of the normalized fluctuations ξ around the scaling laws. In this plot, each gray line is a
distribution for a given indicator, the squares are the average values of these cumulative
distributions and the error bars are 95% confidence intervals obtained via
bootstrapping [44]. We note that the Gaussian distribution (dashed line) describes quite
well these distributions. In particular, the smallest p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests is 0.51, showing that we cannot reject the normality of the fluctuations.
or, equivalently
log10 Y = log10A+ β log10N + log10 η(N) , (5)
where log10A = A and log10 η(N) = σw ξ(N). Notice that, since ξ(N) is normally dis-
tributed, η(N) should be distributed according to a log-normal distribution. In addition
to describe the average scaling laws, Eq. (4) represents a stochastic-like process where
the urban indicator Y follows a power law relation with the population N driven by a
multiplicative noise log-normally distributed.
Regression model: homicides versus urban metrics
As we have mentioned in the introduction, a considerable part of the literature about
criminality tries to correlate crime indicators to other urban metrics. Usually, these re-
lationships are obtained from linear regression models, despite the explicit nonlinearities
7present in these variables such as the previous scaling laws. In this context, it is not
uncommon to observe linear regression-based analysis leading to controversial conclu-
sions [34]. A simple alternative that may overcome these nonlinearities is to employ the
logarithmic of the variables, that is,
log10H(i) = C0 +
∑
k
Ck log10 Yk(i) + (i) . (6)
Here, H(i) is the number of homicides in the city i, Yk(i) is the k-th (k > 1) urban
indicator of the city i, C0 is the intercept coefficient, Ck (k > 1) is the linear coefficient
that quantifies the explicative effect of log10 Yk(i), and (i) is the noise term accounting
for the effect of unmeasurable factors.
We have applied the previous model to our data by using ordinary least-squares fit
with a correction to heteroskedasticity [46] and the results are summarized in Table 1.
We first note that, except for sanitation and unemployment, all the urban indicators have
explanatory potential for describing the number of homicides. Also, the value of the
adjusted R2 points out that the model account for about 62% of the observed variance
in number of homicides. When analyzing the individual effects of the urban indicators,
we note that child labour, elderly population, female population, GDP per capita, and
male population are negatively correlated with the number of homicides (H decreases
with the increasing of these indicators). On the other hand, GDP, illiteracy, and income
are positively correlated with the number of homicides (H increases with the increasing
of these indicators). Despite the lack of a more adequate comparison with our data, our
regression results agree but also disagree with some empirical findings of the criminology
literature. For instance, we have found that there is no statistically significant correla-
tion between unemployment and homicides, while a positive and statistically significant
correlation between illiteracy and homicides was observed. However, these indicators are
among those leading to controversial conclusions, as pointed out by Gordon [34].
Naturally, our regression model is quite simple and several improvements are possi-
ble. For instance, some of these metrics may display correlations and, consequently, one
metric may affect the predicability of another, a phenomenon known as mediation [47]. A
possible manner for reducing this effect is by combining some of the metrics and running
different regression models. Another possibility is to employ principal component analysis
(PCA) for reducing redundancy among the urban metrics. Nevertheless, other problems
8Table 1. Regression model coefficients. Values of the linear coefficients Ck
obtained via ordinary least-squares fits with a correction to heteroskedasticity. Here, t is
the value of the t-statistic and p is the two-tail p-value for testing the hypothesis that
the coefficient Ck is different from zero.
k Indicator Yk Coefficient Ck Standard Error t p > |t|
95% Confidence Interval
0 Intercept 322.932 84.653 3.81 0.000
[156.944, 488.920]
1 Child labour -0.146 0.035 -4.11 0.000
[-0.216, -0.076]
2 Elderly population -0.647 0.066 -9.81 0.000
[-0.777, -0.518]
3 Female population -56.644 15.488 -3.66 0.000
[-87.015, -26.274]
4 GDP 121.127 31.375 3.86 0.000
[59.605, 182.648]
5 GDP per capita -120.987 31.375 -3.86 0.000
[-182.509, -59.465]
6 Illiteracy 0.213 0.051 4.11 0.000
[0.111, 0.314]
7 Income 0.223 0.073 3.05 0.002
[0.079, 0.367]
8 Male population -62.459 16.068 -3.89 0.000
[-93.967, -30.952]
9 Sanitation -0.665 0.929 -0.72 0.474
[-2.487, 1.156]
10 Unemployment -0.026 0.028 -0.94 0.347
[-0.082, 0.028]
Adjusted R2 = 0.62
such as bias in the selection of urban metrics and difficulties in drawing qualitative con-
clusions in terms of the PCA axis are still present. Here, instead of discussing the possible
controversies that Table 1 may exhibit as well as possible manner of improving our re-
9gression results, we will compare this simple regression analysis with our new approach
based on the deviations of the scaling laws.
A relative metric: distance to the scaling laws
In addition to overcome the nonlinearities by employing the logarithmic of the urban
indicators, we may also account for the scaling behavior between the urban indicators,
homicides and the population size (Fig 1) aiming a fairer comparison between cities with
different population sizes. We thus have proposed to evaluate the differences between the
actual value of the urban indicators and the expected by the adjusted power law, that is,
DY = log10 Y − 〈log10 Y 〉w
= log10 Y − (A+ β log10N) . (7)
Note that DY identifies whether a urban indicator for the given city is above (DY > 0) or
below (DY < 0) the average scaling law as well as how far it is. We have also evaluated
this distance for the number of homicides, that is, DH = log10H − 〈log10H〉w (note that
we are committing an abuse of terminology when denoting D as a distance). This is the
same idea recently proposed by Podobnik et al. [41] for quantifying the competitiveness
among countries.
We have thus studied the relations between the distance evaluated from the homi-
cide indicator (DH) and the other urban metrics (DY ). Figure 3 shows a scatter plot
of DY versus DH , where we note that all of the urban metrics distances (except unem-
ployment) have statistically significant correlations with the homicide distance (see the
values of Pearson correlation ρ in these plots). We have also observed that the sign of
the correlation coefficient ρ agrees with value of the linear coefficient Ck for the indicators
child labour, elderly population, female population, GDP, income, sanitation, and unem-
ployment. However, for the indicators GDP per capita, illiteracy and male population,
the sign of ρ is opposite to the signal of Ck. This result means, for instance, that while
the regression analysis suggests that the increase in the male population is followed by a
decrease in the number of homicides, the results when considering the relative distances
point out that the more the male population is above the power law tendency, the more the
number of homicides is above the power law tendency. Similar controversial conclusions
are obtained for the indicators GDP per capita and illiteracy.
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Figure 3. Distance to the scaling laws evaluated for the urban indicators
versus the distance evaluated for the number of homicides. Scatter plot of the
distances to the scaling laws evaluated for the urban indicators (DY ) versus the distance
evaluated for the number of homicides (DH). The color code represents the density of
points, going from blue (low density) to red (hight density). We show in each plot the
value and the 95% confidence intervals for the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ. We note
that DY evaluated for GDP, GDP per capita, income, and male population are
positively correlated with DH , while DY related to child labour, elderly population,
female population, illiteracy, sanitation, and unemployment are negatively correlated
with DH . We further observe the bimodal distributions of the relationships for GDP,
GDP per capita, illiteracy, and income.
In addition to the value of the Pearson correlation ρ, the scatter plots in Fig. 3 reveals
other intriguing patterns. We note that the relation between the homicide distance and
the indicators GDP, GDP per capita, illiteracy, and income are characterized by two peaks
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in the density of points, while for all the other indicators the density of points displays
only one peak. We also note that both peaks of these bimodal distributions are located
around DH ≈ 0. This result indicates that, despite the positive values of ρ, there is a
considerable number of cities that displays distance values for DY above and below the
power law tendency with approximately the same value for the distance DH , suggesting
that such indicators may not be as good as the other ones for describing the number of
homicides.
Another manner of extracting meaningful information from Fig. 3 is by evaluating
average values. In order to do so, we have grouped the cities in two sets: those having
DH > 0 (homicides above the power law) and those with DH < 0 (homicides below the
power law). We next evaluate the average value of DY for each group and considering
the cities with absolute value of DH larger than a threshold ∆. Figure 4 shows these
average values as a function of the threshold ∆. We have observed that for the indicators
child labour, illiteracy and sanitation, the average values of DY are significantly different
between the two groups of cities and also that the average of DY increases as ∆ increases
for the cities with DH > 0 and decreases for those ones with DH < 0. The opposite occurs
for the indicators GDP, GDP per capita and income, that is, the average of DY decreases
as ∆ increases for the cities with DH > 0 and increases for those ones with DH < 0.
Intriguingly, for the indicator elderly population we observe that cities with DH below
the power law present an average value of DY larger than those with DH above the power
law; however, this difference is only statistically significant for ∆ . 0.45. This result
suggests that, for cities having a much larger or much smaller number of homicides than
the expected by the power law tendency, the elderly population may have no explanatory
potential. Similarly, for the unemployment indicator, no difference is observed between
the average values of DY above and below the power law until ∆ & 0.56. For slightly
smaller value of ∆, the average value of DY (for unemployment) for cities above the
power law starts to systematically decrease and for ∆ ≈ 0.56 a statistically significant
difference is observed. This result thus provides us a clue for a better understanding of the
explicative potential of the unemployment indicator, by pointing out that (in our data)
its effect is only manifested when DH is much above of the value expected by the scaling
law.
Figure 4 also provides clues of a gender effect in the number of homicides. For female
population, we note that cities with number of homicides above the power law (DH > 0)
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are characterized by an average value of DY < 0 that decreases as the value of ∆ increases.
We also observe that the confidence intervals for the average values of DY above and
below the power law barely overlap each other. These results thus point out that in cities
where the number of homicides is above the expected value, the female population is
systematically smaller than the value expected by the scaling law. For male population,
despite the overlapping in the confidence intervals for the average of DY , we observe an
opposite behavior, that is, cities with number of homicides above the power law are also
characterized by a male population above the power law.
Summary and Conclusions
We have extensively characterized some relationships between crime and urban metrics.
We have initially shown that urban indicators obey well defined average scaling laws with
the population size and also that the fluctuations around these tendencies are log-normally
distributed. Using these results, we have shown that the scaling laws can be represented
by a multiplicative stochastic-like equation (Eq. 4) driven by a log-normal noise. Next,
we have addressed the problem of applying regression analysis for explaining the number
of homicides H in terms of urban indicators Y . Because of the intrinsic nonlinearities, we
have argued that it is better to employ the logarithms of these variables when performing
linear regression analysis (Eq. 4 and Table 1). Furthermore, we have also discussed that
accounting for the scaling phenomenon is also important for a fairer comparison among
cities with different population sizes. We have thus proposed to evaluate the distances
between the actual number of homicides H (DH) as well as the value of the urban indicator
Y (DY ) and the one expected by the average scaling laws. By investigating the Pearson
correlations (ρ) of the relationships between DH and DY , we have found that the value of
ρ have the same signal of the linear coefficient Ck for the indicators child labour, elderly
population, female population, GDP, income, sanitation, and unemployment. On the
other hand, for GDP per capita, illiteracy and male population the signal of ρ and Ck
are opposite. In addition to the values of ρ, we have analyzed the average values of DY
after grouping the cities in two sets: those with number of homicides above the power law
(DH > 0) and those below the power law (DH < 0). This analysis has unveiled intriguing
patterns that were not carried out by the linear regression. In particular, our results
for Brazilian cities pointed out that i) the elderly population may have no explanatory
13
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Figure 4. Average values of the distances to the scaling laws versus the
homicide distance threshold. The average values of distances evaluated for each
urban indicator in function of the homicide distance threshold ∆, after grouping the
cities that are above (red continuous lines) and below (blue dashed lines) the scaling
laws with the population size. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals for these
average values obtained via bootstrapping [44].
potential when the number of homicides is much above or much below of the expected
values by the scaling law, ii) that the effect of unemployment in the number of homicides
is only observed for cities with DH considerably larger than the expected by the power law,
and iii) that there are gender differences in the number of homicides, where cities with
female population below the expected value are characterized by a number of homicides
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above the power law and that cities with number of homicides above the power law are
also characterized by a male population above the power law. We further believe that
the present approach can be applied to other datasets in order to produce more robust
relationships between crime indicators and urban metrics.
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Supplementary Information
Definitions, data sources and additional comments
We have obtained data of all Brazilian cities in the year of 2000 made free available by
the Brazil’s public healthcare system — DATASUS [1]. Below, we describe the indicators
and give some details about the data.
Homicide: injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill, by any
means [2]. This indicator gives the number of deaths caused by assaults. We selected the
death in the DATASUS website whose cause is included in the codes X85-Y09 from the
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) [2].
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Population: this indicator is derived from the population census of 2000 conducted
by IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica) [3] and it reports the total
number of inhabitants of each city. This database also contains information about age
group and gender.
Illiteracy: it gives the number of inhabitants of the total population in a given
geographic area, in the current year, aged 15 or older, who can not read and write at least
a single ticket in the language they know.
Income: this indicator gives the average household incomes per capita of residents in
a given geographic area, in the current year. It was considered as per capita household
income the sum of the monthly income of the household, in reals divided by the number
of its residents.
Unemployment: it gives the number of economically active population aged 16 or
older who is without work during the reference week, in a given geographic area, in the
current year. It is defined as the Economically Active Population (EAP) the number of
persons aged 10 or older who are working or looking for work. For this indicator, it was
considered only the population aged 16 or older.
Child labour: the proportion of the population 10 to 15 years old who is working
or looking for work during the reference week, in a given geographic area, in the current
year.
GDP per capita: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita indicator is the value
of the municipal GDP per capita, being calculated as the municipal GDP of the year
divided by the municipal population in the same year. The values are presented in the
currency real, not being applied deflator or no correction factor .
GDP: it gives the value of the municipal GDP. Values are given in thousands of the
currency real, not being applied deflator or no correction factor .
Elderly population: the number of inhabitant of a given city aged 60 or older.
Sanitation: it gives the number of inhabitants that has access to toilets, garbage
collection and water supply .
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Figure S1. Robustness of the power law exponent versus the number of
windows employed in the average relationships. The value of power law exponent
β versus the number of windows w employed to evaluate the average relationships
between log10 Y and log10N . The error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the value
of β and the horizontal red lines are the average values of β over w. We note the almost
constant behavior of β in function of w.
